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This paper takes a fresh look at the relationship between family background and earnings applying a 
synthetic social mobility index built on distributions of parental and offspring occupational statuses. 
Using the EU-SILC dataset for 8 countries, our analysis shows that country differences mainly 
concern residual background correlations, left after controlling for background-related intervening 
factors such as education and occupation. Behind certain significant residual correlations, observed in 
the UK and in Southern European countries, we may detect respectively penalisation of upward 
mobility and insurance against downward mobility. Insignificant residual effects encompass 
significant penalisation of both downward and upward mobility in Germany and France, a parachute 
for the self-employed in Ireland and no patterns in Nordic countries. In quantile regressions, residual 
background correlations appear to increase along the earnings distribution. Although we are unable to 
provide causal explanations, we suggest that the findings for relatively unequal countries would hardly 
concur with a standard human capital explanation.  
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Recent empirical studies on intergenerational inequality focus on identification of the 
mechanisms generating income persistency. The aim of these studies is to decompose the 
estimated intergenerational earnings elasticity (IGE) and the role played by family 
background during the major steps determining earnings, in particular educational attainments 
and occupational sorting (e.g. Mulligan 1999, Bowles and Gintis 2002, Blanden et al. 2007)1. 
On the evidence offered by these studies it is possible to deliver solid policy guidelines and 
ethical judgements on the fairness of the process of inequality transmission. Since education 
                                                 
*We wish to thank Elena Granaglia, Maurizio Franzini, Paolo Naticchioni, Maurizio Iacopetta, Gaston 
Yalonetzky and participants to the conference ‘Equality of Opportunity: Concepts, Measures and Policy 
Implications’, held in Rome 2011, for useful comments. Usual disclaimer applies. Corresponding author: 
francesco.vona@sciences-po.fr  
1 A further strand of the literature, exploiting information on genetic linkages within families (e.g. Sacerdote 
2002, Bjorklund et al. 2005, Bjorklund et al. 2006), addresses the ambitious issue of identifying the causal 




is the only channel to attain good jobs for disadvantaged offspring with weaker social 
networks, the more occupational sorting depends on family ties (i.e. ascription) the less 
acceptable will be a given level of intergenerational persistence2.  
On top of effects on education and occupation, a residual correlation of parental 
background and child earnings appears to persist after controlling for narrowly defined social 
origins and destinations (Bowles and Gintis 2002). In fact, within the range of income 
outcomes achievable in a certain, narrowly defined, social position, there may emerge an 
order related to family background. The purpose of this paper is to see whether this order is 
driven by income penalties for those who improve their social position, engendering a sort of 
glass ceiling, or whether it is associated with a parachute for the offspring of the well-off 
ending up in bottom social positions.  
From a theoretical standpoint, penalties and returns to upward and downward social 
mobility are likely to stem from different sources. In a competitive labour market, if 
unobservable individual skills do not depend upon observable background variables, one 
would expect to observe positive (resp. negative) returns associated with upward (resp. 
downward) social mobility. In this case, those who improve (resp. worsen) the parental 
position improve upon (resp. decline from) the parental position should be more (resp. less) 
endowed with unobservable skills positively affecting incomes. Under a milder assumption of 
partial correlation between individual unobservable skills and parental background, two forces 
tend to offset each other. On one hand, a better average endowment of unobservable acquired 
skills (soft skills, access to better schools, and higher parental investment in education) for the 
offspring of the well-off is itself a source of background-related earning advantage. On the 
other hand, the tougher selection process to access top occupations from the bottom inflates 
the average level of unobservable abilities of the less-advantaged pupils, both in top and 
bottom social positions3. 
One can hence argue that unobservable acquired skills positively related to background 
should be paramount in top social positions. Conversely, in bottom social positions, the 
composition effect brought about by a tougher selection process should more than offset the 
disadvantage in terms of unobservable acquired skills. This argument holds under the 
plausible assumption that the effect of background is self-reinforcing during the process of 
skill formation (Cunha and Heckman 2007). Because of the inherent difficulties in offsetting 
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an initial lack of parental investment at later educational stages, heterogeneity in unobservable 
skills is likely to increase with the years of education attained. And, empirically, a relatively 
higher observed dispersion in returns to tertiary qualifications seems to support this statement 
(Lemieux 2006, Cholezas and Tsakloglou 2007).  
On the empirical side, for the sake of precision in estimating residual returns to social 
mobility it is essential first to provide close specification of what we mean by social position 
and then to summarize intergenerational movements along the social scale by means of a 
synthetic index. The major original contribution represented by this paper consists in building 
such a synthetic index, borrowing from sociological literature the idea of considering parental 
occupations as the main background variable4.  
In particular, for both offspring and parents we convert the ISCO two-digit occupational 
classes available in the dataset used in this paper (EU-SILC 2005) into a ‘quasi continuous’ 
measure of social position with the ISEI index. This measure is then further refined by 
considering, in a hierarchical order, other relevant information serving to generate a finer 
ranking of social positions for both generations, hence obtaining two surrogate distributions 
of, respectively, parent and child social positions. Finally, we rely on these two surrogate 
distributions to construct a relative mobility variable, i.e. the Relative ISEI (henceforth Isei-
rel), computed as the difference between the decile obtained by the child and the one occupied 
by the best parent in their respective distributions. On aggregate, the Isei-rel index can tell us 
which of the two main effects, i.e. composition or unobservable acquired skills, tend to 
prevail in each country5. Moreover, the underlined Isei-rel distribution can be used to compute 
both returns to short- and long-distance mobility and returns to mobility in different parts of 
the income distribution.  
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Having supplied further details on 
the Isei-rel variable (section 2), the subsequent three sections present the main results of our 
empirical analysis for 8 European countries representative of different welfare regimes 
(Germany, France, Spain, Italy, the UK, Ireland, Denmark and Finland). In section 3, 
preliminary analyses of occupational mobility show that parent and child occupations are 
closely correlated everywhere. Section 4 outlines the econometric strategy and presents 
                                                 
4 Unlike other non-income proxy of earning potential such as education, the parental occupational level attained 
at mature carrier stages encompasses several key aspects of background such as the individual position in the 
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and Treiman 1996, Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). 
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unobservable variables (e.g. parents’ and children’s abilities), in the following sections we never consider as 




estimates of the residual correlation between background and earnings, obtained controlling 
for the main background-related intervening factors. In section 5 we re-express this residual 
effect by means of the Isei-rel variable, which can be further decomposed to assess the link 
between earnings and upward and downward intergenerational mobility. Use of the Isei-rel 
variable evidences that behind residual effects of similar size there may be completely 
different patterns across countries. These results are discussed in the 6th, conclusive section.  
 
2. How to measure relative social mobility 
The main aim of the paper is to measure the association between social mobility and 
earnings. To this end a key task is to construct, for each country, two distributions that capture 
the relative social position of children and their better parent, i.e. the one with the higher 
occupational status6. 
Unlike approaches based on discrete social classes, a continuous index can be used to 
build distributions of social positions allowing for precise quantification of relative changes 
(improvement or worsening) in the child’s situation with respect to the parental one7. 
Specifically, such changes can be ascertained taking the percentile variation between the 
parental and the child’s position. For instance, a child having the better parent in the ith 
percentile improves its position by k if it is in the (i+k)th percentile.  
In order to obtain surrogate distributions of social positions for both the better parent and 
the child, we use the International Socio-Economic Index of occupational status (ISEI) as it is 
empirically validated on a very large database and outperforms other indexes of social 
prestige in explaining background-related attainments (Gazeboom et al. 1989, Gazeboom et 
al. 1992). The ISEI index is based on the simple idea that “occupation is the intervening 
activity linking education and income” (Ducan 1961, p. 116-7). In particular, it is built so as 
to maximize the indirect influence of education on income (Gazeboom et al. 1992). In 
practice, this maximization involved the implementation of an iterative procedure on a large 
dataset covering 16 countries over a considerable number of years (for further details see 
Gazeboom et al. 1992). With the updated conversion tables provided by Gazeboom and 
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within social classes, an issue that is looming ever larger given the widespread social fragmentation following 
upon the process of tertiarization of economic systems. Moreover, having a synthetic indicator is recognized as a 




Treiman (1996) it is possible to assign a quantitative ISEI value to each two-digit ISCO 
occupational group available in our dataset, hence re-expressing it on a continuous scale. 
However, the fact that ISCO occupations are available only at the two-digit level in the 
EU-SILC dataset brings the two distributions of origins and destinations to be clustered in a 
few mass points (fig. 1). It follows that the derived percentiles, i.e. deciles, of the two 
marginal distributions of, respectively, the better parent and the child are not well-balanced. 
Since we are mainly interested in relative social positions rather than absolute ones, we use 
other qualitative information to smoothen the original ISEI distribution for both generations.  
In particular, we rank individuals with the same ISEI using other variables that also 
approximate their social positions, i.e. immigrant status, educational levels, family 
composition and, for the parental distribution, also the occupational and educational 
attainments of the less achieving parent. Exploitation of this additional information follows a 
hierarchical order, namely each additional variable is used to modify the ranking of the 
individuals with the same level of all variables considered at the previous step. More 
precisely, those individuals with the same ISEI are first ranked according to their immigrant 
status, those with the same ISEI and immigrant status are further ranked following their 
educational attainments, and so on8. With this refinement we are able to obtain two smooth 
distributions of social origins and destinations. 
The final step consists in finding the appropriate measure to quantify the movement of 
each individual with respect to his/her best parent. Among the possible measures, absolute 
differences between child and parental ISEI, depurated by changes in the distribution of ISEI 
across generations, presents three major disadvantages. First, this measure does not allow for 
exploitation of the additional information provided by the refined distributions of social 
positions. Second, absolute differences would be dependent on the way specific ISEI values 
are assigned to ISCO occupations. Third, since the distribution of occupations improves due 
to the on-going process of structural change, relative positions in the marginal distribution 
capture intra-generational social influence and prestige better than absolute ones9.   
For these reasons, we prefer to use a relative measure of social mobility, constructed as the 
difference between the child and the parent decile of their respective marginal distributions 
                                                 
8 Since the derived distributions are refinements of the original ISEI distribution, the results do not change if we 
change the hierarchical order of the other criteria considered to order origins and destinations. Moreover, we 
prefer to build an index that maintains a hierarchy of family circumstances rather than using a latent variable 
approach, i.e. principal components, as not all these circumstances are equally important in determining socio-
economic success.      
9 Note that in both the child and the parent distribution several generations overlap; however, since we consider 




and normalized so as to vary between 0 and 2. We can clarify this with some examples: (??) 
the Isei-rel measure of mobility is equal to 1 when offspring and parents achieve the same 
decile of the ISEI distribution; it assumes a value of 0.4 when a child having the better parent 
in the 8th decile ends up in the 4th decile and amounts to 1.5 when the better parent is in the 5th 








In the following paragraphs the Isei-rel measure is used first to analyze cross-country 
differences in relative occupational mobility (section 3), and then to assess the link between 
mobility and earnings (section 5). 
 
3. Dataset, Descriptive and Preliminary Analysis of Occupational Mobility 
The first cross-sectional wave of the European Union Survey on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC 2005) includes a specific module focusing on intergenerational 
mobility. In all the Member States persons interviewed aged over 24 and under 65 had to 
reconstruct the home environment when they were around 14 years old, providing a detailed 
picture of their family background, i.e. family composition, number of siblings, financial 
distress, parents’ education and occupation. Additionally to these background variables, for 
each individual the dataset provides information on income and several variables that are used 
to account for it in wage equations: employment status (contractual arrangements, months 
worked, usual hours worked each week), educational attainment (coded through ISCED), 
occupation, potential experience, citizenship, degree of urbanization of the living area and 
personal characteristics (gender, age, marital status).  
Following suggestions in the literature on intergenerational inequality (Haider and Solon 
2006), the usual caveat of considering only prime-age workers is applied here, i.e. those aged 
35-49 for whom the process of intergenerational transmission has fully displayed its effects. 
The analysis is carried out for 8 countries – the five largest European economies (Germany, 
France, UK, Spain and Italy) plus Ireland, Finland and Denmark10 – that are representative of 
                                                 
10 Sweden has not been included because about 90% of the answers on parental occupation are missing. 
Questions on parental occupation display a very high response rate (higher than 95%) in 6 out of 8 countries; 
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However, missing data do not seem to be concentrated among the more disadvantaged individuals: the R2 of a 
regression of the dummy ‘missing parental occupation’ on child occupation, education, citizenship and labour 




the four welfare regimes usually identified by the literature (Esping Andersen 1990, Ferrera 
1996).  
Table 1 displays for each country changes in the average ISEI and in its standard deviation 
from parents to offspring generations. A general improvement in occupational levels occurs 
everywhere, but it is more pronounced in the two Southern countries where the parents’ 
average occupational statuses were initially lower. In the parental generation, the standard 
deviation in ISEI is closely correlated with the mean and the convergence of the occupational 
structure in the child generation is also accompanied by a convergence in the ISEI standard 
deviation. For each country, figures 1a-1h show in more detail how the process of structural 
changes leads to a change in the distribution of occupational statuses in favour of top and 
average occupations, associated with a higher ISEI.  
Going on to bivariate correlations between parent and child ISEI, Germany emerges as the 
‘most mobile’ country, whilst Italy, France and Spain represent the least mobile (table 1, last 
column)11. With the exception of the UK, the country ranking is preserved when parent-child 
ISEI correlations are estimated in a multivariate regression including additional controls (table 
2), i.e. age, sex, immigrant status and especially child education attainments, whose levels are, 
as we know, strongly affected by family background (e.g. Hertz et al. 2007). Everywhere, the 
association between parental and offspring occupational outcomes is highly significant, 
pointing to a non-negligible ascription effect, but the differences are minor. Depurated of the 
relative size of the variance in the two marginal ISEI distributions, the estimated parent-child 
correlation in occupational attainment reaches the highest level between 0.19 and 0.21 in 
France, Denmark, Spain and the UK, whereas it appears slightly above 0.13 in Ireland and 
Germany (see table 2 row 3). Similar patterns across countries also emerge using mobility 
tables along quintiles of the two marginal ISEI distributions of parents and offspring (see 
Raitano and Vona 2011 for further details).   
As a final exercise to test cross-country differences in occupational mobility, we plot for 
each country the Kernel density function of the ‘refined’ Isei-rel variable (figures 2a-2h). In 
every country, the Isei-rel distribution looks very similar: the mode is close to 1 (where 
                                                 
11 The sociological literature on social mobility usually follows two methods for comparing occupations across 
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Goldthorpe 1992, followed also in the international comparisons in Breen 2004); ii) computing intergenerational 
correlations of index of socio-economic status (ISEI). For cross country comparisons of these correlations, see 
Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996, 2003), which, contrary to the evidence provided by EU-SILC, include Germany 
among the ‘immobile’ countries. However, the ISEI correlations currently available seem to have problems in 




parents and offspring achieve the same relative social positions) and the density is 
substantially higher than that corresponding to the normal distribution. 
In sum, the influence of family background on children’s occupational attainments appears 
considerable in all the countries. However, as is well known, the degree of income 
intergenerational mobility substantially differs across countries. Looking for possible 
explanations of these differences, it seems of paramount importance to study if a ‘residual’ 
association between parental occupations and children earnings still emerges when, keeping 
constant individual education and occupation, determinants of labour incomes are analyzed in 
a fully-fledged wage equation model. 
 
4. Empirical Strategy and Residual Returns to Background 
4.1 The empirical strategy 
As an initial step in the econometric analysis carried out in this section, we attempt to 
quantify the association between parental ISEI and child earnings. In particular, we wish to 
assess whether a residual effect of parental occupations on gross labour incomes persists once 
other intervening factors – offspring education and occupation – are included among the 
covariates. This step is crucial in order to ground further analyses of the returns to upward and 
downward mobility on solid bases as it enables us to establish the connection between the 
linear residual impact of parental background and that of the relative mobility, as computed 
through the Isei-rel variable.  
Our empirical strategy is relatively simple as we mainly follow an incremental approach to 
decompose the link between parental background and earnings12. As a benchmark, for each 
country we estimate a basic earning equation with standard controls13 and parental ISEI (i.e. 
the highest ISEI level attained by father or mother) as our variable of interest. Subsequently, 
we compute the fraction of the parental effect captured by intervening factors adding first 
child education and then her/his ISEI. Finally, in the analyses carried out in section 5 we 
replace the parental ISEI with the Isei-rel index and also use quintiles of the Isei-rel 
distribution to assess the impact on earnings of short- and long-distance upward and 
downward mobility.  
                                                 
12 Similar incremental strategies are followed by studies attempting to decompose the impact of background on 
earnings, see Bowles and Gintis (2002), Bowles et al. (2005), Blanden et al. (2007), Lefranc and Trannoy 
(2005), Osterbacka (2001). 
13 Namely : age, age squared, potential experience, sex, immigrant status, marital status, typology of area of 




In order to account for the inadequacy of continuous measure of occupational status to 
deal with immobility (Gazeboom et al. 1992) and to capture the informal transfer of specific 
skills that might represent another source of earning advantage (see Galor and Tsiddon 1997), 
we also include a dummy equal to 1 if both the child and her/his better parent get the same 
ISCO two-digit job.  
Furthermore, all the analyses are carried out for both logs of gross hourly wages and logs 
of total yearly gross labour incomes14 (from employment and self-employment), using the 
sample weights provided in the intergenerational section of EU-SILC 2005. This robust 
verification is required in order to ensure that the results are not driven by measurement errors 
of two kinds. In the case of hourly wages, these are due to intrinsic problems of the EU-SILC 
dataset15, while for incomes, measurement errors can stem from badly reported self-
employment earnings. The joint analysis of hourly wages and incomes is also useful for 
economic reasons, the former being a proxy of the worker’s human capital endowment while 
the latter is considered the most comprehensive measure of permanent well-being, capturing 
other aspects likely to be related to family background, such as the contract typology and the 
number of hours and months worked (Bowles and Gintis 2002, Solon 2002, Jenkins and 
Siedler 2007). Finally, to reduce the influence of outliers, we exclude from the wage 
regressions those earning an hourly wage below 1 euro and working less than 15 hours per 
week.  
  
4.2 The residual link between background and earnings  
The estimated coefficient of parental ISEI in Model A (table 3 and 4, respectively for 
yearly incomes and hourly wages as dependent variables) displays the overall association 
between family relative position and offspring earnings. Not surprisingly, for both labour 
incomes and hourly wages, this impact is positive and highly significant at 1% confidence 
level in all the countries. As emerges clearly on comparing the estimated coefficients of all 
the models in tables 3 and 4, parental ISEI has a greater effect on incomes than on wages 
insofar as parental background also affects intermediate variables related to annual incomes 
(type of contract, time of work). 
                                                 
14 In Italy and Spain wages and incomes are considered net of taxes. Hence, compared to the other six countries, 
the size of estimated background effects for these two countries constitutes a sort of a lower bound, as tax 
progressivity turns out to have the effect of mitigating income differences. 
15 EU-SILC dataset does not provide very accurate identification of hourly wages for all countries, because for 
most of them only information on incomes in the previous year is recorded, while the information on the features 




In line with the usual country rankings in terms of intergenerational inequality (Bjorklund 
and Jantti 2009), the association between parental ISEI and children earnings is relatively 
lower in the Nordic countries and in Germany16, stands at an average level in France and 
Ireland, and is relatively higher in Italy, Spain and the UK. Quantifying cross-country 
differences, the estimated coefficient of parental ISEI for the more equal countries is less than 
half the size of the coefficient for the less equal ones17.  
As expected, when we add child education among the explanatory variables (Model B, 
tables 3 and 4), we observe a generalized decline in the effect of parental ISEI. With regard to 
incomes, the significance of parental ISEI disappears for the Nordic countries and 
substantially declines in Ireland. The parental ISEI coefficient almost halves everywhere but 
in Italy and in the UK, where formal educational attainments capture respectively 1/3 and 1/4 
of the parental effect on earnings, and in Denmark, displaying a larger 60% drop. By contrast, 
the effect of background on hourly wages remains significant in every country but Germany.  
The next step is to include child occupational characteristics among the regressors, namely 
the child ISEI and the dummy ascertaining whether the children stay in the same ISCO two-
digit occupation as their parents. On yearly labour income, the residual parental effect 
disappears for every country but those with higher levels of intergenerational inequality, i.e. 
Italy, Spain and the UK (Model C, tab. 3)18. Combined, child occupation and education 
account for less than 2/3 of the original parental ISEI coefficient in Italy, whereas in the UK 
and in Spain the explained fraction slightly increases up to 0.70 and 0.76 respectively. For 
hourly wages (Model C, tab. 4), the coefficient of parental ISEI remains slightly significant at 
85% also in Ireland and changes sign in a statistically significant way in Germany, becoming 
negative. With respect to the overall correlation between wages and background estimated in 
model A, the fractions left unexplained are 41% in the UK, 33% in Italy and 24% in Spain 
(tab. 4). 
Having established these important results, the next step is to achieve a better 
understanding of the sources of this residual earning advantage linked to family background. 
 
                                                 
16 In Nordic countries a smaller impact of parental occupation could be due to the more compressed labour 
income distribution (Kenworthy 2008). 
17 Note that Germany represents the only deviation with respect to the usual ranking of countries, as it is often 
perceived as a country characterized by an average level of intergenerational mobility (d’Addio 2007, Corak 
2006). This discrepancy can be explained by the modest representativeness of the German population in the EU-
SILC dataset underlined by some authors (Causa et al. 2009). 
18 Since our ISEI levels are based on two-digit ISCO recorded by EU-SILC, the positive association between 





5. Earnings and relative occupational mobility 
5.1 The association between earnings and mobility 
The analyses presented in the previous section corroborate the fact that background-
related earning advantages respect the usual country ranking in terms of intergenerational 
inequality. However, linear specification of the residual background effect (i.e. the mere 
inclusion of parental occupations) does not suffice to disentangle whether the association 
between family background and children’s earnings acts as a parachute for the few well-off 
offspring who end up in bottom occupations, or if it emerges in top occupations conjuring up 
a glass-ceiling effect in favour of children remaining in the same high social positions as their 
parents.  
Re-expressing the residual background correlation in terms of our Isei-rel variable 
represents an attempt in this direction. In principle, both coefficients of the parental ISEI and 
of the Isei-rel variable should capture a residual link between background and earnings. 
However, the sign of the Isei-rel coefficient has a slightly different interpretation, being the 
aggregate resultant of the rewards associated with upward and downward mobility, 
respectively. More precisely, the Isei-rel coefficient expresses earning rewards and penalties 
associated with a one-decile change in the joint distribution of origins and destinations.  
With inclusion of the Isei-rel in the analysis we find the previous results confirmed both in 
terms of fitness of the regressions and with respect to the country ranking (Models D1 in 
tables 5 and 6). The only difference emerges for France, where on average climbing the 
relative occupational ladder is linked to a significant wage penalty at the 90% level (table 6).  
Irrespective of the dependent variable chosen, the UK, Italy and Spain remain the 
countries with the highest and most significant background effect. For hourly wages (table 6), 
the UK displays the greatest impact, being a one-decile increase in the social outcome 
associated with a 2.0% earnings cut. With regard to annual labour incomes (table 5), Italy 
takes the lead with a 1.8% penalty for people increasing their relative occupational position. 
Among the remaining countries, Germany and Denmark show a positive impact of mobility 
on incomes, which in Germany proves significant for hourly wages. In Ireland, the sign tends 
to be negative but insignificant, while in Finland the signs of the Isei-rel coefficient change 
when moving from yearly incomes to hourly wages, but the association is never statistically 
significant.  
The next step is to split the synthetic Isei-rel variable into its quintiles and replace it with 





5.2 Earnings and upward/downward mobility 
The Isei-rel index condenses the impact of upward and downward relative occupational 
mobility, but it does not provide any insight as to which of the two impacts is paramount. In 
contrast, the quintiles of the Isei-rel distribution proved revealing in this respect. With regard 
to the third quintile where the ‘stayers’ are (i.e. people whose occupational decile is very close 
to their parents’), the first and the fifth quintiles capture, respectively, long-distance 
downward and upward social mobility. In turn, the two even quintiles account for short-
distance movements. Note that, since the distribution of Isei-rel is very similar across 
countries (see section 3), the quintiles roughly coincide.  
Taking income as dependent variable (Model D2, table 5), the high Isei-rel coefficient for 
the UK stems from a heavy penalty associated with upward mobility rather than a parachute 
for downward mobility. This penalty amounts to 6.5% for short-distance upgrades and to a 
remarkable 13.4% for the long distance. On the contrary, the negative aggregate Isei-rel 
coefficient appears associated with a generous insurance for those who worsen their position 
in the two Southern European countries. Both in Italy and in Spain, the parachute effect 
appears similar in size, ranging between 5.1-6.8% for short-distance downward mobility to 
6.7-8.8% for the long distance. Unlike Spain, Italy displays a significant penalty for long-
distance upward mobility. Also in Ireland, a sizeable and significant parachute effect emerges 
for short-distance downgrading. In turn, Germany, France and Denmark display an inversion 
in the effect of parental origin on income, both upward and downward mobility generally 
being penalized. The penalty for long-distance downward mobility is especially large in 
Germany and in Demark, where it is significant at cut-off 80% level. France is the only 
country where penalties on upward and downward mobility are large and both significant.  
In the case of hourly wages (Model D2, table 6), Ireland joins the two Nordic countries, 
showing no significant background effects, while Italy and the UK present an almost identical 
structure of rewards and penalties as that observed for incomes. However, compared to model 
D2 of table 5, the effects are weaker in Italy and stronger in the UK, where short-distance 
downward mobility is also rewarded at 85% significance level. The significance of the 
parachute effect disappears in Spain, but the significance (85%) of the penalty for long-
distance upward mobility increases. The more equalizing pattern followed by Germany for 
hourly wage is driven by the disappearance of penalties for upward mobility, whose 




robust if we consider two synthetic dummies ‘upward’ and ‘downward’, merging the 
respective dummies for long- and short-distance mobility (Model D3, tables 5 and 6). 
 
5.3 Quantile regressions 
Another way to decompose the aggregate impact of mobility on earnings consists in 
looking at its effect at different points of the income distribution using quantile regression 
techniques (Koenker 2005). In tables 7-10 we report for both dependent variables and for each 
decile of the earnings distribution the estimated coefficients for parental ISEI, Isei-rel and 
upward and downward Isei-rel mobility dummies.  
For both labour incomes and hourly wages, tables 7 and 9 show that the background 
variable coefficients tend to increase along the income distribution in almost every country 
but Spain, suggesting a stronger residual role of background in well-paid positions. This 
increasing pattern is robust to the way of calculating the residual correlation (linear parental 
Isei, model C, or Isei-rel, model D1), and is more evident in Germany, Finland, France than in 
the UK, Denmark, Italy and Ireland. In Denmark, the pattern becomes flat for hourly wages; 
however, as in the case of Finland, the residual correlations never prove significant for both 
measures of earnings.  
The two Anglo-Saxon countries display a decreasing background effect in the top deciles 
of the distribution. This decrease at the top is particularly pronounced in Ireland, where the 
background coefficients become almost insignificant in the last deciles. In line with previous 
results, both the parental Isei and Isei-rel coefficients point to a significant background 
correlation along the whole wage and income distribution in the UK.  
In France and Germany, residual background correlations tend to change sign moving 
upward in the earning distribution. In particular, both coefficients indicate that a better 
background is penalized in bottom deciles, especially in Germany where this penalty is 
significant, whilst it is rewarded in top deciles, especially in France with the background 
effect turning significantly positive above the 4th decile.  
Finally, the two Southern countries display a strongly significant residual background 
correlation, almost flat along the whole distribution. In the case of Italy alone, acceleration in 
the size of the background advantage is observed in the very top deciles of the distribution. 
For hourly wages, also the UK exhibits a flatter pattern of Isei coefficients. 
 Tables 8 and 10 display the distribution of the effects of short- and long-distance Isei-rel 




scale is observed in the less equal countries: both for incomes and wages in Italy, only for 
incomes in Spain and Ireland, and only for wages in the UK. In the case of incomes, the 
significance of the parachute effect diffuses up to the central deciles in the two Southern 
countries, while in Ireland it appears persistent also in the upper part of the distribution and is 
mainly associated with short-distance downgrading. For hourly wages, generous insurances 
against downward mobility are observed up to the 7th decile in Italy and in the UK. In the 
remaining countries, downward mobility tends to be penalized in the bottom deciles, 
especially in Germany.  
With regard to the link between upward mobility and incomes, the penalties tend to be 
significantly above the median everywhere and are mainly linked to long-distance 
occupational improvements. For hourly wages, on the other hand, the penalties for upward 
mobility turn out to be insignificant everywhere but in Spain, France and the UK. This 
diverging result for our two dependent variables conveys the fact that the top incomes for self-
employment can easily be inherited. Also important is the fact that the penalties for upward 
mobility are very heavy and diffused also below the median in countries where access to 




This paper proposes a synthetic measure of social mobility that can be used to decompose 
the residual correlation between parental background and child earnings left after controlling 
for major background-related intervening factors, namely educational and occupational 
achievements. Preliminarily, our analysis shows that the differences among the 8 countries 
selected apply mainly to these residual background correlations rather than patterns of 
occupational mobility. Subsequently, we use our Isei-rel measure of occupational and social 
mobility to bring to light significant country differences in the ways in which 
intergenerational mobility is rewarded or penalized.  
The highly significant residual correlation between background and earnings observed in 
the UK and in Southern European countries, especially Italy, reflects respectively penalties 
for upward mobility and generous insurance against downward mobility, also observed in 
Ireland. Insignificant residual background associations encompass penalties for both 
downward and upward mobility in Germany and France, and no evident patterns in Nordic 
                                                 
19 See among the others Blanden and Machin (2004), Chevalier and Conlon (2003), Albouy and Wanecq (2003), 




countries. Furthermore, quantile regressions show that everywhere but in Spain the residual 
background correlations tend to be larger significantly above the median. Also, the more 
equal societies display steeper increases in the background effect along the distribution than 
the less equal ones. Finally, parachutes are stronger below the median while penalties for 
upward mobility prevail above. 
 Whereas our analysis allows to isolate a residual effect of background on earnings, the 
origins of this effect remain difficult to identify with our dataset. However, at least two 
findings hardly tally with a standard human capital explanation of residual background 
associations. First, the flat pattern along the earning distribution observed especially in 
Southern countries implies that parental background residually affects earnings independently 
of child abilities. Provided that child ability and parental background are complementary 
inputs in the ‘production’ of unobservable skills for which we cannot control (soft and non-
cognitive skills20, behavioural traits, genetic inheritance, etc.), the background effects should 
uniformly increase along the joint income-ability distribution. Secondly, for similar reasons 
parachute effects and positive returns to downward mobility hardly fit with a fairly intuitive 
implication of human capital theory: the fact that those who downgrade should have worse 
unobservable characteristics than those who stay or improve up to a certain social position. 
Informal labour market networks might help account for the background-related earning 
gaps, suggesting a source of discrimination in labour market opportunities  and hiring 
probabilities for individuals with different connections (Montgomery 1991, Ioannides et al. 
2004, Granovetter 2005). In relation with our analysis, it is worth noting that family ties 
represent a natural network in themselves that will prove all the more extensive and strong 
proportionately with the height of the family’s social position and its capacity to ‘leverage 
social relations for economic purposes’ (Granovetter 2005, p. 39). Such an explanation can be 
particularly useful to account for the parachute effect prevalent in the bottom deciles of the 
income distribution insofar as jobs found through personal contacts tend to be concentrated in 
the low-quality occupations (Pellizzari 2004)21.  
                                                 
20 Recent studies (Bowles and Gintis 2002, Osborne-Groves 2005, Goldthorpe and Jackson 2008) emphasize the 
impact of family role models on the development of children’s non-cognitive traits closely related to labour 
market success– the so called soft skills, i.e. elements shaping social and relational competences such as risk 
aversion, extroversion, willingness to work in a team, the sense of discipline or leadership, or also factors, at 
least partially genetically inheritable, such as height, weight and beauty. In particular, Goldthorpe and Jackson 
(2008) point out that in post-industrial societies employers (mostly in the services sector) when recruiting 
employees and deciding on promotions attach less importance to cognitive and technical abilities (certified by 
degrees, the so-called hard skills) and more to soft skills, largely dependent on the family background. 
21 For Italy, Raitano (2011) observes that the sign of the association between earnings and having gained the 
current job through informal networks differs according to the parental occupational background: the estimated 




Unlike family connections in the labour market, penalties for upgrading may simply 
reflect the fact that the offspring of the well-off either inherit soft skills and behavioural traits 
positively correlated with earnings or have access to better quality schools. Background-
related inequalities in educational achievements are documented in an extensive sociological 
and economic literature (e.g. Shavit et al., 2007, Hertz et al. 2007, OECD thematic review on 
tertiary education 2008) highlighting the way that gaps tend to shift from a quantitative to a 
qualitative dimension as a country develops. Educational policies establish the size of this 
gap, more or less explicitly determining the criteria to access high quality schools. If access to 
a good school is closely linked to parental background, then similar educational attainments 
can cover up different effective levels of human capital22.  
Going back, now, to our cross-country analysis, positive returns to downward mobility 
emerge in countries where labour market ties and non-educational mechanisms of social 
reproduction are commonly thought to distort the allocation of workers to jobs. In turn, 
penalties on upward mobility characterize the more developed countries showing greater 
heterogeneity in the upper levels of the educational systems. In this respect, a growing strand 
of research for France and the UK documents how differences in the access to high quality 
schools determine different patterns of skill formation and hence earning prospects for the 
individual depending on parental background23. In particular for Britain, the empirical 
evidence points to a substantial heterogeneity in the schooling system which can fairly well 
account for the earning polarization observed in the middle and top part of the distribution. In 
France, access to an elite university, e.g. the ‘Grande Ecole’, is so very dependent on family 
background that president Sarkozy recently proposed reserving a quota of places for pupils 
from disadvantaged backgrounds, falling back on a second-best policy that fails to address the 
roots of this disadvantage.  
Two final caveats are in order. First, the two-digit classification of ISCO occupations 
available in our dataset provides a still crude and aggregate measure of occupational quality. 
With finer examination of occupational classes part of the correlation between background 
and earnings is likely to appear, rather, as an effect on occupational sorting. Second, even 
considering prime-age workers only, there is a non-negative probability that these workers are 
temporarily unemployed or in bad matches. If background alters the worker’s external option 
                                                                                                                                                        
through informal channels is correlated with an earning penalty for the offspring of parents working in bottom 
occupations. 
22 In schooling systems where access is conditioned by the neighbourhood of residence, for example, pupils end 
up in schools with fairly homogeneous peers, hence replicating the home environment at school. 
23 See, among others, Chevalier and Conlon (2003), Blanden and Machin (2004), Machin and Pischke (2006), 




and influences the probability of being in one of these two states, a fraction of the residual 
background correlation that we have estimated is ultimately driven by differences in labour 
market policies. For Italy, by merging the EU-SILC dataset with the panel of working 
histories provided by administrative sources we will be able to investigate this issue in future 
studies and assess the role of parental background in shaping working careers.  
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Tab. 1: Parental and offspring ISEI and intergenerational correlation in ISEI levels.  
Individuals aged 35-49. 
Mean ISEI ISEI S.D. 
 Parents Offspring % Change Parents Offspring % Change
Pearson correlation 
between   parental 
and offspring ISEI 
Germany 44.5 48.4 8.9 15.3 14.3 -6.5 0.266 
France 39.8 43.4 9.1 14.7 14.6 -0.6 0.383 
Spain 34.7 40.7 17.3 14.1 15.2 7.5 0.415 
Italy 36.7 42.5 16 13.9 14 1.4 0.363 
UK 44.2 47.4 7.1 15.7 15.6 -0.6 0.309 
Ireland 42.1 47 11.8 15.5 16.3 5.2 0.308 
Denmark 43.2 45.4 5.1 16.7 15.3 -8.7 0.317 
Finland 40.4 46.8 15.7 16.1 15.6 -3.4 0.336 
Source: elaborations on EU-SILC 2005 data 
 
 
Tab. 2: OLS estimated coefficients of parental highest ISEI level on offspring ISEI1.  
Individuals aged 35-49. 
 DE FR ES IT UK IE DK FI 
Coefficient 0.1283 0.2073 0.2044 0.1820 0.1974 0.1401 0.1780 0.1573 
Depurated coeff. 0.1373 0.2086 0.1901 0.1795 0.1985 0.1332 0.1950 0.1628 
Robust S.E. 0.0124 0.0153 0.0146 0.0142 0.0152 0.0256 0.0237 0.0187 
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Obs. 7,201 4,656 7,096 9,597 3,906 2,066 1,688 2,579 
R2 0.255 0.360 0.450 0.337 0.249 0.350 0.255 0.418 
F 159.0 197.0 315.0 205.0 131.0 72.2 50.4 146.0 
1 Control variables are age, age squared, potential experience, gender, immigrant status, marital status, a dummy 
if living in an urban area and two offspring educational attainment dummies (upper secondary or tertiary 
























Tab. 3: Estimated coefficients of parental highest ISEI level.  
OLS on logs of yearly gross labour income (net for Italy and Spain)1. Individuals aged 35-49. 
 Model A- only parental ISEI 
 DE FR ES IT UK IE DK FI 
Coefficient 0.0037 0.0063 0.0093 0.0078 0.0094 0.0065 0.0033 0.0040 
Robust S.E. 0.0008 0.0009 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008 0.0018 0.0013 0.0010 
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.000 
Obs. 6,011 4,071 5,609 8,523 3,267 1,573 1,589 2,404 
R2 0.248 0.208 0.285 0.198 0.300 0.338 0.112 0.165 
F 165.0 78.9 144.0 103.0 107.0 49.0 14.3 29.2 
 Model B-parental ISEI & child education 
 DE FR ES IT UK IE DK FI 
Coefficient 0.0021 0.0034 0.0053 0.0054 0.0065 0.0031 0.0014 0.0015 
Robust S.E. 0.0009 0.0009 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008 0.0018 0.0014 0.0011 
P value 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.083 0.303 0.157 
Obs. 6,011 4,071 5,609 8,523 3,267 1,573 1,589 2,404 
R2 0.272 0.253 0.346 0.228 0.337 0.387 0.157 0.218 
F 165.0 86.4 155.0 103.0 111.0 52.2 16.0 39.0 
 Model C- parental ISEI, child education & child ISEI 
 DE FR ES IT UK IE DK FI 
Coefficient -0.0005 -0.0007 0.0022 0.0029 0.0029 0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0010 
Robust S.E. 0.0008 0.0009 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008 0.0017 0.0014 0.0010 
P value 0.563 0.413 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.506 0.476 0.329 
Obs. 6,011 4,071 5,609 8,523 3,267 1,573 1,589 2,404 
R2 0.334 0.338 0.404 0.286 0.413 0.427 0.216 0.270 
F 180.0 114.0 169.0 119.0 136.0 55.5 23.3 45.5 
1 Control variables of model “A” are age, age squared, potential experience, gender, immigrant status, marital 
status, a dummy if living in an urban area, if working part-time and a dummy if income from self-employment is 
larger than income from employment. In model “B” two dummies on offspring educational attainment are added 
(upper secondary or tertiary graduated). In model “C” the offspring ISEI level and a dummy if parental and 
offspring occupations are the same are added.  
























Tab. 4: Estimated coefficients of parental highest ISEI level.  
OLS on logs of hourly gross wage (net for Italy and Spain)1. Individuals aged 35-49. 
 Model - only parental ISEI 
 DE FR ES IT UK IE DK FI 
Coefficient 0.0013 0.0054 0.0068 0.0058 0.0087 0.0058 0.0026 0.0037 
Robust S.E. 0.0007 0.0006 0.0007 0.0006 0.0007 0.0013 0.0007 0.0008 
P value 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Obs. 4,432 3,360 4,217 5,368 2,635 1,106 1,302 1,600 
R2 0.104 0.140 0.198 0.190 0.105 0.242 0.120 0.126 
F 43.3 44.6 60.2 44.9 32.4 19.5 14.0 19.6 
 Model B- parental ISEI & child education 
 DE FR ES IT UK IE DK FI 
Coefficient 0.0001 0.0030 0.0038 0.0033 0.0062 0.0031 0.0014 0.0015 
Robust S.E. 0.0006 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007 0.0012 0.0007 0.0008 
P value 0.926 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.059 0.041 
Obs. 4,432 3,360 4,217 5,368 2,635 1,106 1,302 1,600 
R2 0.149 0.216 0.294 0.261 0.170 0.336 0.167 0.220 
F 57.8 65.8 94.7 60.0 43.8 27.6 16.7 33.1 
 Model C- parental ISEI, child education & child ISEI 
 DE FR ES IT UK IE DK FI 
Coefficient -0.0012 0.0007 0.0016 0.0019 0.0036 0.0015 -0.0001 0.0002 
Robust S.E. 0.0006 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007 0.0011 0.0007 0.0007 
P value 0.044 0.280 0.011 0.001 0.000 0.155 0.934 0.831 
Obs. 4,432 3,360 4,217 5,368 2,635 1,106 1,302 1,600 
R2 0.241 0.297 0.363 0.310 0.256 0.407 0.253 0.286 
F 89.5 79.2 126.0 61.1 64.3 35.2 21.2 38.6 
1 Control variables of model “A” are age, age squared, potential experience, gender, immigrant status, marital 
status, two dummies equal 1 if living in an urban area and if working part-time. In model “B” two dummies on 
offspring educational attainment are added (upper secondary or tertiary graduated). In model “C” the offspring 
ISEI level and a dummy equals 1 if parental and offspring occupations are the same are added. People receiving 
incomes also from self-employment, working fewer than 15 hours at week or earning less than 1 euro per hour 
are excluded from the sample. Standard errors are robust for heteroskedasticity.  
























Tab. 5: Estimated coefficients of Relative ISEI1.  
OLS on logs of yearly gross labour income (net for Italy and Spain). Individuals aged 35-49. 
  Model D1 - Relative ISEI 
Independent  
variable  DE FR ES IT UK IE DK FI 
Isei-rel 
Coeff. 0.0440 0.0158 -0.1184 -0.1756 -0.1630 -0.0743 0.0746 0.0294 
Rob. S.E. 0.0415 0.0439 0.0367 0.0337 0.0442 0.0920 0.0796 0.0597 
P value 0.289 0.719 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.419 0.349 0.622 
 Obs. 6,011 4,071 5,609 8,523 3,267 1,573 1,589 2,404 
 R2 0.334 0.338 0.404 0.288 0.414 0.427 0.217 0.270 
 F 180.0 114.0 167.0 120.0 137.0 55.4 23.4 45.5 
  Model D2 - Quintiles of Relative ISEI 
Independent  
variable  DE FR ES IT UK IE DK FI 
Q1 of  
Isei-rel 
Coeff. -0.0741 -0.0254 0.0876 0.0674 -0.0088 0.1075 -0.1033 -0.0242
Rob. S.E. 0.0371 0.0385 0.0320 0.0356 0.0366 0.0883 0.0768 0.0507 
P value 0.046 0.509 0.006 0.058 0.809 0.224 0.179 0.634 
Q2 of  
Isei-rel 
Coeff. 0.0149 -0.0577 0.0508 0.0680 0.0029 0.1651 -0.0491 0.0290 
Rob. S.E. 0.0353 0.0347 0.0362 0.0355 0.0339 0.0815 0.0755 0.0445 
P value 0.673 0.096 0.161 0.055 0.932 0.043 0.516 0.515 
Q4 of  
Isei-rel 
Coeff. -0.0611 -0.0633 0.0237 0.0330 -0.0645 0.0700 -0.0264 0.0409 
Rob. S.E. 0.0388 0.0332 0.0311 0.0290 0.0370 0.0800 0.0628 0.0500 
P value 0.115 0.057 0.446 0.256 0.081 0.382 0.674 0.413 
Q5 of  
Isei-rel 
Coeff. -0.0351 -0.0393 -0.0279 -0.1099 -0.1337 0.0613 -0.0496 -0.0397
Rob. S.E. 0.0341 0.0345 0.0305 0.0339 0.0392 0.0777 0.0596 0.0441 
P value 0.303 0.255 0.361 0.001 0.001 0.430 0.406 0.367 
 Obs. 6,011 4,071 5,609 8,523 3,267 1,573 1,589 2,404 
 R2 0.335 0.339 0.405 0.289 0.413 0.430 0.217 0.271 
 F 153.0 94.9 142.0 102.0 114.0 47.6 19.7 38.7 
  Model D3 - Grouped quintiles of Relative ISEI 
Independent  
variable  DE FR ES IT UK IE DK FI 
Q1-Q2 of  
Isei-rel 
Coeff. -0.0245 -0.0448 0.0731 0.0615 -0.0049 0.1440 -0.0705 0.0036 
Rob. S.E. 0.0308 0.0310 0.0299 0.0331 0.0296 0.0766 0.0685 0.0408 
P value 0.426 0.149 0.015 0.064 0.869 0.060 0.304 0.929 
Q4-Q5 of  
Isei-rel 
Coeff. -0.0466 -0.0542 -0.0023 -0.0117 -0.0961 0.0715 -0.0350 -0.0133
Rob. S.E. 0.0309 0.0300 0.0275 0.0283 0.0317 0.0731 0.0563 0.0384 
P value 0.132 0.071 0.932 0.678 0.003 0.328 0.535 0.729 
 Obs. 6,011 4,071 5,609 8,523 3,267 1,573 1,589 2,404 
 R2 0.334 0.339 0.404 0.285 0.413 0.429 0.217 0.270 
 F 171.0 106.0 157.0 112.0 127.0 52.9 22.0 43.0 
1 Control variables as in model C. In model D1 the variable of interest is the continue “Relative ISEI”; in model 
D2 the quintiles of the “Relative ISEI” distribution (the third quintile of Relative ISEI is the omitted variable); in 
model D3 quintiles 1 and 2 and, respectively, quintiles 4 and 5 are grouped together in single dummy. Standard 
errors are robust for heteroskedasticity. 














Tab. 6: Estimated coefficients of Relative ISEI.  
OLS on logs of hourly gross wage (net for Italy and Spain)1. Individuals aged 35-49. 
  Model D1 - Relative ISEI 
Independent  
variable  DE FR ES IT UK IE DK FI 
Relative  
ISEI 
Coeff. 0.0765 -0.0512 -0.0860 -0.1107 -0.1996 -0.0517 0.0057 -0.0293
Rob. S.E. 0.0294 0.0304 0.0281 0.0271 0.0377 0.0619 0.0414 0.0406 
P value 0.009 0.093 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.404 0.891 0.472 
 Obs. 4,432 3,360 4,217 5,368 2,635 1,106 1,302 1,600 
 R2 0.242 0.298 0.364 0.312 0.256 0.406 0.253 0.286 
 F 90.0 77.7 125.0 61.7 65.1 36.0 21.3 38.6 
  Model D2 - Quintiles of Relative ISEI 
Independent  
variable  DE FR ES IT UK IE DK FI 
Q1 of  
Isei-rel 
Coeff. -0.0441 -0.0330 0.0216 0.0624 0.0374 0.0588 -0.0140 0.0197 
Rob. S.E. 0.0272 0.0273 0.0246 0.0271 0.0313 0.0722 0.0443 0.0371 
P value 0.105 0.227 0.381 0.021 0.232 0.416 0.751 0.595 
Q2 of  
Isei-rel 
Coeff. -0.0074 -0.0524 -0.0138 0.0584 0.0489 0.0830 0.0294 0.0102 
Rob. S.E. 0.0216 0.0249 0.0293 0.0272 0.0307 0.0790 0.0374 0.0328 
P value 0.732 0.035 0.637 0.032 0.111 0.294 0.431 0.756 
Q4 of  
Isei-rel 
Coeff. 0.0114 -0.0601 0.0033 0.0303 -0.0463 0.0565 0.0221 0.0133 
Rob. S.E. 0.0220 0.0242 0.0259 0.0243 0.0332 0.0621 0.0357 0.0364 
P value 0.604 0.013 0.898 0.212 0.164 0.364 0.536 0.716 
Q5 of  
Isei-rel 
Coeff. 0.0270 -0.0751 -0.0388 -0.0364 -0.1280 0.0216 0.0035 -0.0276
Rob. S.E. 0.0213 0.0278 0.0259 0.0268 0.0342 0.0576 0.0383 0.0298 
P value 0.205 0.007 0.134 0.173 0.000 0.707 0.926 0.354 
 Obs. 4,432 3,360 4,217 5,368 2,635 1,106 1,302 1,600 
 R2 0.242 0.299 0.363 0.312 0.256 0.408 0.254 0.287 
 F 74.7 67.1 105.0 50.8 53.4 30.1 18.1 33.5 
Independent  
variable  Model D3 - Grouped quintiles of Relative ISEI 
  DE FR ES IT UK IE DK FI 
Q1-Q2 of  
Isei-rel 
Coeff. -0.0238 -0.0454 0.0077 0.0576 0.0405 0.0710 0.0125 0.0129 
Rob. S.E. 0.0203 0.0227 0.0233 0.0251 0.0263 0.0705 0.0368 0.0305 
P value 0.241 0.046 0.739 0.022 0.124 0.314 0.735 0.672 
Q4-Q5 of  
Isei-rel 
Coeff. 0.0200 -0.0682 -0.0186 0.0112 -0.0841 0.0448 0.0151 -0.0141
Rob. S.E. 0.0191 0.0225 0.0229 0.0230 0.0283 0.0569 0.0338 0.0269 
P value 0.297 0.003 0.416 0.624 0.003 0.431 0.656 0.601 
 Obs. 4,432 3,360 4,217 5,368 2,635 1,106 1,302 1,600 
 R2 0.241 0.299 0.362 0.310 0.254 0.407 0.253 0.286 
 F 84.1 71.3 117.0 56.7 59.8 34.0 20.3 36.1 
1 Control variables as in model C. In model D1 the variable of interest is the continue “Relative ISEI”; in model 
D2 the quintiles of the “Relative ISEI” distribution (the third quintile of Relative ISEI is the omitted variable); in 
model D3 quintiles 1 and 2 and, respectively, quintiles 4 and 5 are grouped together in single dummy. Standard 
errors are robust for heteroskedasticity. People receiving incomes also from self-employment, working fewer 
than 15 hours a week or earning less than 1 euro per hour are excluded from the sample. 









Tab. 7: Estimated coefficients of Parental and Relative ISEI1. Quantile regressions on logs of 
yearly gross labour income (net for Italy and Spain). Individuals aged 35-49. 
 Model C – Estimated Coefficient of Parental ISEI 
 DE FR ES IT UK IE DK FI 
10 -0.0018 -0.0031* 0.0036** 0.0010 0.0005 -0.0057* -0.0014 -0.0020 
20 -0.0013 -0.0010 0.0031*** 0.0017** 0.0033*** -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0020 
30 -0.0013 0.0002 0.0024*** 0.0022*** 0.0028*** 0.0025 0.0001 -0.0015 
40 -0.0005 0.0007 0.0019** 0.0028*** 0.0033*** 0.0032** 0.0003 -0.0001 
50 -0.0001 0.0010* 0.0021*** 0.0029*** 0.0035*** 0.0033*** 0.0002 0.0002 
60 -0.0002 0.0014*** 0.0028*** 0.0026*** 0.0040*** 0.0031*** 0.0001 -0.0001 
70 0.0001 0.0013** 0.0017*** 0.0026*** 0.0045*** 0.0031*** 0.0007 0.0000 
80 0.0005 0.0019*** 0.0021*** 0.0032*** 0.0038*** 0.0032*** 0.0013 0.0003 
90 0.0013** 0.0017** 0.0024*** 0.0043*** 0.0035*** 0.0017 0.0013 0.0010 
 Model D1 – Estimated Coefficient of Relative ISEI 
 DE FR ES IT UK IE DK FI 
10 0.1446* 0.1353 -0.2191*** -0.1441** -0.0455 0.1707 0.1392 0.0880 
20 0.1293** 0.0234 -0.1421*** -0.1369*** -0.1611*** -0.0174 0.0833 0.1522**
30 0.1138** -0.0382 -0.1394*** -0.1450*** -0.1639*** -0.1363 0.0129 0.0969* 
40 0.0633** -0.0558** -0.0885** -0.1555*** -0.1717*** -0.1296* 0.0161 0.0223 
50 0.0322 -0.0638** -0.1020*** -0.1543*** -0.1551*** -0.1956*** -0.0061 -0.0196 
60 0.0171 -0.0705** -0.1180*** -0.1452*** -0.2010*** -0.1719*** 0.0040 0.0043 
70 -0.0013 -0.0655** -0.1077*** -0.1253*** -0.2199*** -0.1794*** -0.0160 0.0058 
80 -0.0260 -0.0964*** -0.0931*** -0.1597*** -0.2023*** -0.1832** -0.0366 -0.0384 
90 -0.0533* -0.0877* -0.1327*** -0.2159*** -0.1872*** -0.0760 -0.0669 -0.0839 
1 Control variables as in model C. In model D1 the variable of interest is the continue “Relative ISEI”; in model 
D2 the quintiles of the “Relative ISEI” distribution (the third quintile of Relative ISEI is the omitted variable); in 
model D3 quintiles 1 and 2 and, respectively, quintiles 4 and 5 are grouped together in single dummy. Standard 
errors are robust for heteroskedasticity. Significance level: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  







Tab. 8A: Estimated coefficients of Quintiles of Relative ISEI1 (Model D2 and D3).  
Quantile regressions on logs of yearly gross labour income (net for Italy and Spain). Individuals aged 35-49. 
 Germany France Spain Italy 
 Downward mobility Downward mobility Downward mobility Downward mobility 
  Q1 Q2 Q1-Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1-Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1-Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1-Q2 
10 -0.1022 -0.0201 -0.0451 -0.0857 -0.0328 -0.0338 0.1963*** 0.1566** 0.1900*** 0.1208* 0.2180*** 0.1909*** 
20 -0.1023** 0.0379 -0.0045 -0.0002 -0.0467 -0.0238 0.1027*** 0.0217 0.0680* 0.0664** 0.1309*** 0.0899*** 
30 -0.1152*** 0.0132 -0.0342 0.0163 -0.039 -0.0275 0.1107*** 0.0645* 0.0955*** 0.0628** 0.0786*** 0.0689*** 
40 -0.0707** 0.015 -0.0205 0.0138 -0.0289 -0.0081 0.0655** 0.017 0.0472* 0.0713*** 0.0704*** 0.0632*** 
50 -0.0462** 0.0137 -0.0053 0.033 -0.0103 0.0092 0.035 0.0024 0.0267 0.0655*** 0.0388** 0.0349** 
60 -0.0255 -0.0073 -0.0129 0.0155 0.0095 0.0162 0.0306 0.0021 0.0099 0.0398** 0.0169 0.018 
70 -0.0106 0.0042 -0.0027 -0.0046 -0.0242 -0.0162 0.0176 0.0071 0.0123 0.0273 0.0135 0.0182 
80 0.0135 0.0354 0.0238 -0.0033 -0.0037 -0.0042 -0.0199 -0.0347 -0.0243 -0.0002 -0.0169 -0.011 
90 -0.0158 0.0423 0.0105 0.0238 -0.0028 0.0149 0.0437 -0.0036 0.0264 0.0014 -0.0739*** -0.0198 
 Upward mobility Upward mobility Upward mobility Upward mobility 
  Q4 Q5 Q4-Q5 Q4 Q5 Q4-Q5 Q4 Q5 Q4-Q5 Q4 Q5 Q4-Q5 
10 -0.0651 -0.0495 -0.0472 0.0272 0.0287 0.0355 0.1020* -0.0159 0.0468 0.1561*** 0.019 0.1044** 
20 -0.0364 0.0173 0.0058 -0.0301 -0.0285 -0.0263 0.0353 -0.0386 -0.0045 0.0767*** -0.0526* 0.0374 
30 -0.0241 -0.0017 -0.0104 -0.0311 -0.0452 -0.0506** 0.0550* 0.002 0.0279 0.0505** -0.0615** 0.007 
40 -0.0222 -0.0072 -0.008 -0.0425 -0.0654** -0.0465** 0.0181 -0.0132 -0.0033 0.0455** -0.0749*** 0.0073 
50 -0.0454** -0.0096 -0.0336* -0.0291 -0.0448* -0.0420** -0.0241 -0.0626** -0.0332 0.0262 -0.0862*** -0.0185 
60 -0.0486** -0.0015 -0.0204 -0.0395* -0.0529** -0.0424** -0.0279 -0.0666*** -0.0452** 0.0042 -0.1057*** -0.029 
70 -0.0317* -0.0171 -0.0269* -0.0681*** -0.0524** -0.0603** -0.0287 -0.0762*** -0.0588*** -0.0234 -0.1026*** -0.0385** 
80 -0.0027 -0.0063 -0.0055 -0.0821*** -0.0560** -0.0726*** -0.0572** -0.0953*** -0.0739*** -0.0672*** -0.1321*** -0.0835*** 
90 -0.0218 -0.0695** -0.0319 -0.0893** -0.0023 -0.0494 -0.0073 -0.0808** -0.0517 -0.1073*** -0.1752*** -0.1113*** 
1 Control variables as in model C. In model D1 the variable of interest is the continue “Relative ISEI”; in model D2 the quintiles of the “Relative ISEI” distribution (the third 
quintile of Relative ISEI is the omitted variable); in model D3 quintiles 1 and 2 and, respectively, quintiles 4 and 5 are grouped together in single dummy. Standard errors are 
robust for heteroskedasticity. Significance level: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  





Tab. 8B: Estimated coefficients of Quintiles of Relative ISEI1 (Model D2 and D3).  
Quantile regressions on logs of yearly gross labour income. Individuals aged 35-49. 
 UK Ireland Denmark Finland 
 Downward mobility Downward mobility Downward mobility Downward mobility 
  Q1 Q2 Q1-Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1-Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1-Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1-Q2 
10 -0.0744 -0.0444 -0.0511 -0.0728 0.2751* 0.3079** -0.3847*** -0.1529 -0.2041* -0.0701 0.1422 0.0596 
20 0.0118 -0.0169 -0.0103 0.0567 0.1614** 0.1343** -0.1175 -0.0568 -0.0742 -0.1197** -0.0363 -0.0479 
30 0.0407 0.0475 0.036 0.2201** 0.1641** 0.1796** -0.0157 0.0234 0.0037 -0.0547 0.0195 -0.0341 
40 0.0336 0.0523 0.0388 0.1701** 0.1306** 0.1486** -0.0156 0.0129 0.0105 -0.0351 0.0146 -0.0204 
50 0.0482 0.0371 0.0421* 0.1083 0.1034* 0.1167** 0.0065 0.0248 0.0154 -0.0023 -0.0002 -0.0042 
60 0.0417 0.0347 0.0403 0.1155** 0.1001** 0.1099*** -0.014 0.0176 0.0071 -0.0023 0.0056 0.0032 
70 0.0199 0.0403 0.025 0.0518 0.0745** 0.0542* -0.0006 0.0365 0.0237 0.0011 0.029 0.0097 
80 0.0017 0.0493 0.0313 0.0556 0.0589 0.0491 0.0092 0.0372 0.0369 0.0481 0.0388 0.0353 
90 -0.0525 -0.0303 -0.0432 0.0441 0.0778 0.0412 -0.0797 -0.0721 -0.0744 0.058 -0.0119 0.0314 
 Upward mobility Upward mobility Upward mobility Upward mobility 
  Q4 Q5 Q4-Q5 Q4 Q5 Q4-Q5 Q4 Q5 Q4-Q5 Q4 Q5 Q4-Q5 
10 -0.0938 -0.0832 -0.0834 0.042 0.2698* 0.2366 0.0075 -0.0394 -0.0331 0.0705 0.0641 0.0364 
20 -0.0294 -0.1201*** -0.0946** 0.105 0.0846 0.1052 -0.0467 -0.0409 -0.0419 0.0573 0.0155 0.04 
30 -0.031 -0.1128*** -0.0629** 0.0937 0.0641 0.0835 -0.029 -0.0011 -0.0216 0.0575 -0.004 0.0167 
40 -0.0189 -0.1118*** -0.0661** 0.0623 0.0274 0.0494 0.0028 0.0002 -0.0039 -0.0013 -0.0315 -0.0226 
50 -0.0475 -0.0984*** -0.0721*** 0.0006 -0.0552 -0.013 0.0106 0.0005 0.0077 0.0089 -0.0342 -0.0224 
60 -0.0813** -0.1287*** -0.0907*** 0.0345 -0.0398 -0.0039 0.0026 -0.0144 0.0044 0.0476 -0.0203 0.002 
70 -0.0580* -0.1280*** -0.0916*** -0.0188 -0.1184*** -0.0448 0.032 -0.0122 0.0222 0.0599 -0.0137 0.0015 
80 -0.0197 -0.1310*** -0.0888** -0.0076 -0.1154** -0.0524 0.0125 -0.035 0.0049 0.0449 -0.0193 0.0049 
90 -0.1033* -0.2309*** -0.1499*** 0.0763 0.0057 0.0403 -0.0526 -0.1521*** -0.1180** -0.0223 -0.0849** -0.0428 
1 Control variables as in model C. In model D1 the variable of interest is the continue “Relative ISEI”; in model D2 the quintiles of the “Relative ISEI” distribution (the third 
quintile of Relative ISEI is the omitted variable); in model D3 quintiles 1 and 2 and, respectively, quintiles 4 and 5 are grouped together in single dummy. Standard errors are 
robust for heteroskedasticity. Significance level: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  





Tab. 9: Estimated coefficients of Parental and Relative ISEI1.  
Quantile regressions on logs of hourly gross wage (net for Italy and Spain).  
Individuals aged 35-49. 
 Model C – Estimated Coefficient of Parental ISEI 
 DE FR ES IT UK IE DK FI 
10 -0.0044*** -0.0002 0.0017* 0.0022*** 0.0027*** -0.0005 0.0005 -0.0007 
20 -0.0021*** 0.0006 0.0019** 0.0015*** 0.0030*** 0.0004 0.0001 -0.0006 
30 -0.0013*** 0.0009* 0.0017** 0.0017*** 0.0030*** 0.0020 0.0000 0.0003 
40 -0.0005 0.0014*** 0.002*** 0.0019*** 0.0036*** 0.0017 -0.0001 0.0009 
50 -0.0002 0.0014*** 0.0021*** 0.0018*** 0.0039*** 0.0026*** -0.0001 0.0005 
60 0.0002 0.0011** 0.0015** 0.0023*** 0.0037*** 0.0031*** 0.0001 0.0002 
70 0.0004 0.0012** 0.0011* 0.0023*** 0.0042*** 0.0036*** 0.0005 0.0003 
80 0.0009** 0.0015*** 0.0016** 0.0026*** 0.0042*** 0.0026*** 0.0007 0.0006 
90 0.0011* 0.0021** 0.0016*** 0.0033*** 0.0040*** 0.0011 0.0001 0.0014 
 Model D1 – Estimated Coefficient of Relative ISEI 
 DE FR ES IT UK IE DK FI 
10 0.2518*** -0.0059 -0.1100** -0.1100*** -0.1980*** 0.0404 0.0146 0.0966 
20 0.1183*** -0.0299 -0.0910*** -0.0786*** -0.1746*** -0.0111 0.0070 0.0478 
30 0.0958*** -0.0533** -0.0663** -0.0872*** -0.1780*** -0.0697 0.0107 -0.0178 
40 0.0429* -0.0709*** -0.0994*** -0.0975*** -0.1897*** -0.0622 0.0197 -0.0531 
50 0.0393** -0.0840*** -0.0917*** -0.0946*** -0.1945*** -0.0878 0.0157 -0.0312 
60 0.0077 -0.0618** -0.0603** -0.1115*** -0.1873*** -0.0976** -0.0029 -0.0326 
70 -0.0104 -0.0665*** -0.0718*** -0.1125*** -0.1900*** -0.1327 -0.0136 -0.0118 
80 -0.0306 -0.0698** -0.0531* -0.1283*** -0.2273*** -0.0722 -0.0351 -0.0542 
90 -0.0552* -0.0986** -0.0435 -0.1587*** -0.2126*** 0.0297 -0.0076 -0.1098*
1 Control variables as in model C. In model D1 the variable of interest is the continue “Relative ISEI”; in model 
D2 the quintiles of the “Relative ISEI” distribution (the third quintile of Relative ISEI is the omitted variable); in 
model D3 quintiles 1 and 2 and, respectively, quintiles 4 and 5 are grouped together in single dummy. Standard 
errors are robust for heteroskedasticity. People receiving incomes from also self-employment, working fewer 
than 15 hours a week or earning less than 1 euro per hour are excluded from the sample. Significance level: * 
p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
























Tab. 10A: Estimated coefficients of Quintiles of Relative ISEI1 (Models D2 and D3). Quantile regressions on logs of hourly gross wages (net for 
Italy and Spain). Individuals aged 35-49. 
 Germany France Spain Italy 
 Downward mobility Downward mobility Downward mobility Downward mobility 
  Q1 Q2 Q1-Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1-Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1-Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1-Q2 
10 -0.0780* 0.0013 -0.0293 -0.0792* -0.0731* -0.0781** 0.042 -0.0296 0.0068 0.1085*** 0.1162*** 0.1029*** 
20 -0.0820** 0.0063 -0.0269 -0.0438 -0.0537* -0.0558** 0.0389 -0.0073 0.0248 0.0857*** 0.0833*** 0.0863*** 
30 -0.0766*** -0.0223 -0.0370* -0.0056 -0.036 -0.0257 0.0108 -0.0104 0.0065 0.0613*** 0.0512** 0.0540*** 
40 -0.0411** -0.014 -0.0215 0.0033 -0.0236 -0.0087 0.035 0.0015 0.0242 0.0648*** 0.0475** 0.0560*** 
50 -0.0254 -0.0197 -0.02 -0.0075 -0.0248 -0.0163 -0.0079 -0.0286 -0.0108 0.0690*** 0.0519*** 0.0573*** 
60 0.0105 -0.0032 0.0057 -0.0062 -0.0108 -0.0117 0.0005 -0.0161 -0.0114 0.0682*** 0.0389** 0.0463*** 
70 0.0128 0.0011 0.0091 0.0136 0.0011 0.0056 -0.0027 -0.0041 -0.0038 0.0509** 0.0293 0.0408** 
80 0.0137 -0.0196 -0.0064 -0.004 -0.0303 -0.0224 -0.0014 0.0052 -0.002 0.0469** 0.0381* 0.0334* 
90 0.0272 0.0417 0.0329 -0.0019 -0.0424 -0.0253 -0.0149 -0.0409 -0.0193 0.0634** 0.0145 0.0233 
 Upward mobility Upward mobility Upward mobility Upward mobility 
  Q4 Q5 Q4-Q5 Q4 Q5 Q4-Q5 Q4 Q5 Q4-Q5 Q4 Q5 Q4-Q5 
10 0.1397*** 0.1732*** 0.1456** -0.0102 -0.1156*** -0.0731* 0.0387 -0.0316 0.0134 0.0588** 0.0046 0.0405 
20 0.0526 0.0582* 0.0541* -0.0266 -0.0747** -0.0455* 0.0394 -0.0174 0.0138 0.0530*** 0.0092 0.0420** 
30 -0.0042 0.0242 0.0106 -0.0245 -0.0467* -0.0403* 0.0022 -0.0475* -0.0202 0.0262 -0.0192 0.0102 
40 -0.0115 0.0018 -0.0027 -0.0276 -0.0610** -0.0389* 0.0106 -0.0356 -0.0114 0.0306 -0.0287 0.0152 
50 -0.0214 0.011 -0.0038 -0.038 -0.0715*** -0.0520** -0.0254 -0.0773*** -0.0433* 0.0275 -0.0153 0.0157 
60 -0.0057 0.0196 0.0067 -0.0379* -0.0524** -0.0479*** -0.0202 -0.0702*** -0.0411* 0.0038 -0.0446** -0.0071 
70 -0.0197 -0.0118 -0.0159 -0.0176 -0.0346 -0.0255 -0.0181 -0.0439* -0.032 -0.0048 -0.0497** -0.0174 
80 -0.0016 -0.0324* -0.0254 -0.0308 -0.0497* -0.0451* -0.0073 -0.0471 -0.0218 0.002 -0.0557** -0.0136 
90 0.0143 -0.0329 0.003 -0.0549 -0.0594 -0.0612* -0.0312 -0.0512 -0.0455 0.0001 -0.0920*** -0.0309 
 
1 Control variables as in model C. In model D1 the variable of interest is the continue “Relative ISEI”; in model D2 the quintiles of the “Relative ISEI” distribution (the third 
quintile of Relative ISEI is the omitted variable); in model D3 quintiles 1 and 2 and, respectively, quintiles 4 and 5 are grouped together in single dummy. Standard errors are 
robust for heteroskedasticity. People receiving also incomes from self-employment, working fewer than 15 hours a week or earning less than 1 euro per hour are excluded 
from the sample. Significance level: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  




Tab. 10B: Estimated coefficients of Quintiles of Relative ISEI1 (Models D2 and D3).  
Quantile regressions on logs of hourly gross wages. Individuals aged 35-49. 
 UK Ireland Denmark Finland 
 Downward mobility Downward mobility Downward mobility Downward mobility 
  Q1 Q2 Q1-Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1-Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1-Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1-Q2 
10 0.0901* 0.0362 0.0667*** -0.0646* -0.1397*** -0.0814* -0.0912 0.0329 -0.0033 -0.0403 -0.0301 -0.0299 
20 0.0625* -0.0053 0.021 -0.0075 -0.0693 -0.0419 -0.0286 0.0401 0.015 -0.0344 -0.0021 -0.0066 
30 0.0555 0.039 0.0408* 0.0858 0.0036 0.0364 -0.0134 0.0235 0.0186 -0.0261 -0.0139 -0.0164 
40 0.0448* 0.0454* 0.0447** 0.0882* 0.0352 0.0639 -0.0008 0.0193 0.0175 0.0127 0.018 0.0127 
50 0.0372 0.0672** 0.0457* 0.0724 0.0879** 0.0772** 0.017 0.0262 0.0233 0.0283 -0.0027 0.0059 
60 0.0476* 0.0756*** 0.0620** 0.0239 0.0414 0.0285 0.043 0.0431 0.0438 0.0379 0.0186 0.0291 
70 0.0541 0.0890*** 0.0633** 0.0256 0.06 0.0261 0.0294 0.0176 0.0253 0.0332 0.0289 0.0244 
80 0.0166 0.0727* 0.0458 -0.0442 -0.0029 -0.0079 0.037 0.0247 0.0221 0.064 0.0369 0.0387 
90 -0.0089 0.0119 0.0036 -0.0094 0.0386 0.006 0.0668 0.0445 0.0451 0.0707 -0.0148 0.0101 
 Upward mobility Upward mobility Upward mobility Upward mobility 
  Q4 Q5 Q4-Q5 Q4 Q5 Q4-Q5 Q4 Q5 Q4-Q5 Q4 Q5 Q4-Q5 
10 -0.0148 -0.0661 -0.0222 -0.0085 -0.0257 0.0053 -0.0252 -0.0191 -0.012 -0.013 0.0038 0.0009 
20 -0.0004 -0.0981*** -0.0725** -0.0007 -0.0173 -0.0139 -0.0032 0.0086 -0.0001 0.0392 -0.0035 0.0162 
30 -0.0333 -0.1117*** -0.0606** 0.0288 0.0097 0.0164 -0.0114 0.0162 0.0045 0.0047 -0.0304 -0.0184 
40 -0.0539** -0.1298*** -0.0818*** 0.0263 0.0157 0.0135 -0.0021 0.0281 0.0158 -0.0099 -0.0317 -0.0264 
50 -0.0710** -0.1426*** -0.0898*** 0.0113 0.0193 0.0024 0.002 0.0273 0.0133 0.035 -0.0151 -0.0124 
60 -0.0544** -0.1317*** -0.0838*** -0.0402 -0.0541** -0.0446 0.0416 0.031 0.0366 0.056 -0.0213 -0.0067 
70 -0.046 -0.1116*** -0.0762** -0.0437 -0.0742* -0.0647 0.0228 0.0081 0.0235 0.0364 -0.0149 0.0136 
80 -0.0607 -0.1236*** -0.1090*** -0.0358 -0.0895 -0.0563 0.0273 0.0074 0.0114 0.0394 -0.0201 0.0044 
90 -0.056 -0.2057*** -0.1266*** 0.1397** -0.0069 0.0325 0.1249*** 0.0418 0.0664* -0.014 -0.0479 -0.0413 
1 Control variables as in model C. In model D1 the variable of interest is the continue “Relative ISEI”; in model D2 the quintiles of the “Relative ISEI” distribution (the third 
quintile of Relative ISEI is the omitted variable); in model D3 quintiles 1 and 2 and, respectively, quintiles 4 and 5 are grouped together in single dummy. Standard errors are 
robust for heteroskedasticity. People receiving also incomes from self-employment, working fewer than 15 hours a week or earning less than 1 euro per hour are excluded 
from the sample. Significance level: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  




Fig. 1a: Distribution of offspring and parental ISEI in Germany. 
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Fig. 1b: Distribution of offspring and parental ISEI in France. 
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Fig. 1c: Distribution of offspring and parental ISEI in Spain. 
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Fig. 1d: Distribution of offspring and parental ISEI in Italy. 
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Fig. 1e: Distribution of offspring and parental ISEI in UK. 












16 23 25 30 31 32 33 34 38 43 45 48 49 50 51 55 68 69 70 80
Parental ISEI Offspring ISEI  
 
Fig. 1f: Distribution of offspring and parental ISEI in Ireland. 
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Fig. 1g: Distribution of offspring and parental ISEI in Denmark. 












16 23 25 30 31 32 33 34 38 43 45 48 49 50 51 55 68 69 70 80
Parental ISEI Offspring ISEI  
 
Fig. 1h: Distribution of offspring and parental ISEI in Finland. 
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kernel = gaussian, bandwidth = 0.0452
Source: elaborations on EU-SILC 2005 data

















kernel = gaussian, bandwidth = 0.0493
Source: elaborations on EU-SILC 2005 data



















kernel = gaussian, bandwidth = 0.0453
Source: elaborations on EU-SILC 2005 data
















kernel = gaussian, bandwidth = 0.0426
Source: elaborations on EU-SILC 2005 data




















kernel = gaussian, bandwidth = 0.0510
Source: elaborations on EU-SILC 2005 data
















kernel = gaussian, bandwidth = 0.0580
Source: elaborations on EU-SILC 2005 data



















kernel = gaussian, bandwidth = 0.0604
Source: elaborations on EU-SILC 2005 data

















kernel = gaussian, bandwidth = 0.0555
Source: elaborations on EU-SILC 2005 data
Fig. 2h: Kernel density of Relative ISEI in Finland
 
 
 
 
 
 
